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ABSTRACT 
Title VII cases alleging sex harassment have become almost completely 
deferential to employers who have anti-harassment policies. In this Note, I discuss 
legal and sociological influences on this development and propose using restorative 
justice focused mediation to avoid rendering Title VII entirely ineffective. Mediation 
should only be compelled as a remedy—after a court finds that harassment occurred, 
but that the plaintiff cannot prove her employer knew about the harassment. Instead 
of dismissing these cases—where judges have already found illegal discrimination—
some corrective action should be imposed on the employer for its failure to maintain 
a harassment-free workplace. Focusing mediation on principles of restorative justice 
makes the parties likely to understand and respond to each other’s points of view. 
Harassers who understand how harassment harms their victims will be more receptive 
to changing their behavior than if they were punished without explanation. Employers 
that understand the effect of harassment on their employees will feel a stronger 
responsibility to actively monitor their workplaces for unacceptable conduct.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Senator Simpson: But let me tell you, if what you say this man said to you 
occurred . . . , why in God’s name would you ever speak to a man like that 
the rest of your life?1 
Anita Hill: That is a very good question, and I am sure that I cannot answer 
that to your satisfaction. . . . I was afraid . . . this response, this kind of 
response, is not atypical, and I can’t explain. It takes an expert in psychology 
 
1 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 128 (1991) 
[hereinafter Thomas Nomination Hearings] (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
2021]         EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEX HARASSMENT  679 
 
to explain how that can happen, but it can happen, because it happened to 
me.2 
Anita Hill’s testimony was hailed by her supporters in 1991 as a turning point in 
how the nation would understand sex-based harassment.3 A record number of women 
ran for and were elected to Congress, earning 1992 the nickname the “Year of the 
Woman.”4 The following years saw more milestones for gender equality. Women 
finally served as Secretary of State and Speaker of the House.5 Congress enacted the 
Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act after a demoralizing Supreme Court decision and an 
inspirational dissent.6 Women can now serve in combat.7 A woman finally received 
 
2 Id. (testimony of Anita F. Hill). 
3 Fresh Air, For Years, Anita Hill Was a ‘Canary in the Coal Mine’ for Women Speaking Out, 
NPR, at 1:46 (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/567430106 
[https://perma.cc/2F8X-TK2Z]. I’m using “sex harassment” or “sex-based” harassment, as it 
tends to be more descriptive of the harassment many women face. “Sexual harassment” tends 
to imply some type of sexual motive, although the motive is often gender hierarchy and status. 
See Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment Discrimination 
Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 20–22 (2008); Lauren B. Edelman & Jessica 
Cabrera, Sex-Based Harassment and Symbolic Compliance, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 
363–65 (2020).  
4 Many people link this rise in political activism directly to how the all-white, all-male Senate 
Judiciary Committee treated Professor Hill during the Thomas nomination hearings.  See, e.g., 
Michael S. Rosenwald, No Women Served on the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1991. The Ugly 
Anita Hill Hearings Changed That., WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2018/09/18/no-women-served-senate-judiciary-
committee-ugly-anita-hill-hearings-changed-that/ [https://perma.cc/D5F3-G85Q]; Alix 
Strauss, Key Moments Since 1992, ‘The Year of the Woman,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/us/02timeline-listy.html 
[https://perma.cc/9J9V-CLBZ]. 
5 Strauss, supra note 4. 
6 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (calling on Congress to overturn the Court’s “parsimonious reading of Title VII”). 
A year and a half after the Court’s decision, Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 1, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)). 
7 A five-year analysis of the 2015 decision to allow women in combat found that women are 
slowly trickling into the military in increasing numbers. Emma Moore, Women in Combat: 
Five-Year Status Update, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC. (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/women-in-combat-five-year-status-update 
[https://perma.cc/UQ26-ZRNR]. However, the integration of women in combat roles was 
particularly slow, and even faced opposition in the Marine Corps, who sought to be exempted 
from the policy. Id. Whether the decision to allow women in combat was the right one remains 
controversial. Compare Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, Women Don’t Belong in Combat Units, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/women-dont-belong-in-combat-
units-11547411638 [https://perma.cc/TS3N-X8JZ] (“The Obama-era policy of integrating 
women into ground combat units is a misguided social experiment that threatens military 
readiness and wastes resources in the service of a political agenda.”), with Micah Ables, Women 
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the presidential nomination from a major party.8 Women all over the world listened to 
allegations of sexual assault and harassment against powerful men, and said, “Me 
too.”9 For the first time in the country’s history, a woman is serving as Vice 
President.10  
In 2018, another Supreme Court nominee was accused of sexual misconduct, and 
again the Senate held a hearing. In the aftermath of that hearing, the progress made 
between 1991 and 2018 seemed minimal. While Dr. Ford was treated with more 
respect than Professor Hill, it was clear that many Senators didn’t consider the 
allegations against Judge Kavanaugh serious enough to disqualify him from a seat on 
the Supreme Court. In the words of a Washington Post columnist: “Some [Senate 
Republicans] will bad-mouth [Kavanaugh’s accusers], while others will sound 
concerned. But in all cases, they will keep Kavanaugh’s nomination moving forward, 
whatever the truth of the matter. After all, it is a man’s world.”11 
The shift in Senators’ treatment of Professor Hill and Dr. Ford is one in tone, not 
in substance. Senators who found the hearings politically inconvenient couldn’t blame 
Dr. Ford for the assault or attack her character—such outwardly sexist sentiments 
 
Aren’t the Problem. Standards Are., MOD. WAR INST. AT W. POINT (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://mwi.usma.edu/women-arent-problem-standards/ [https://perma.cc/CVW3-NYPQ] 
(responding to Mac Donald, supra, and arguing that physical standards are about how a soldier 
responds to physical demands, and further arguing that the military should not overturn the 
policy because it has not perfected integration in under five years).   
8 Patrick Healy & Jonathan Martin, Democrats Make Hillary Clinton a Historic Nominee, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/politics/dnc-speakers-
sanders-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/G4NU-B7T3]. 
9 See generally ME TOO., https://metoomvmt.org/get-to-know-us/history-inception/ 
[https://perma.cc/J5L8-RWH4] (introducing a movement aimed—among other things—at 
implementing systemic change in the area of sexual harassment and assault); Alyssa Milano 
(@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/919659438700670976?lang=en (bringing the Me Too 
movement and sex harassment to the nation’s attention). 
10 Elissa Nadworny, Kamala Harris Sworn in as Vice President, NPR (Jan. 20, 2021, 11:43 
AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/inauguration-day-live-
updates/2021/01/20/958749751/vice-president-kamala-harris-takes-the-oath-of-office 
[https://perma.cc/4BFN-6YVH]; Chelsea Janes, Kamala Harris, Daughter of Jamaican and 
Indian Immigrants, Elected Nation’s First Female Vice President, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2020, 
11:43 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kamala-harris-vice-
president/2020/11/07/5e6cb460-1df2-11eb-90dd-abd0f7086a91_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/HN8J-QCW3] (“A vice president-elect stepped forward on Saturday, and, for 
the first time in American history, she was not a man. . . . Harris’s victory comes 55 years after 
the Voting Rights Act abolished laws that disenfranchised Black Americans, 36 years after the 
first woman ran on a presidential ticket and four years after Democrats were devastated by the 
defeat of Hillary Clinton, the only woman to win the presidential nomination of a major party.”). 
11 Helaine Olen, Opinion, Why Senate Republicans Won’t Ferret out the Truth About Brett 
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would be recognized and condemned. Instead, they focused on issues other than Dr. 
Ford’s credibility—such as the timing of the allegations, concern over Kavanaugh’s 
reputation and his family’s reputation, concerns over the integrity of the hearing12—
and even appeared to sympathize with her.13 In diverting the focus of the hearing from 
 
12 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 710–11 (2018) [hereinafter Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing] 
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“[T]he circus atmosphere that has been created since my 
Democratic colleagues first leaked Dr. Ford’s allegations to the media 2 weeks ago, after sitting 
on them for 6 weeks, I might add, has brought us the worst in our politics. . . . This is worse 
than Clarence Thomas. I did not think it could get any worse than that. This is a national disgrace 
the way you are being treated. And in the middle of it all, we have Judge Kavanaugh, a man 
who until 2 weeks ago was a pillar of the legal community . . . .”); id. at 702–03 (statement of 
Sen. Lindsey Graham) (“To my Republican colleagues, if you vote no, you are legitimizing the 
most despicable thing I have seen in my time in politics. . . . I hope you are on the Supreme 
Court. That is exactly where you should be.”); id. at 705 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) (“I 
cannot think of a more embarrassing scandal for the United States Senate since the McCarthy 
hearings when the comment was about the cruelty of the process toward the people involved, 
and the question was asked, ‘Have you no sense of decency?’ And, I am afraid we have lost 
that, at least for the time being.”); id. at 726–27 (statement of Sen. Ted Cruz) (“Let me say to 
you and your family, thank you for a lifetime of public service. I will say watching your 
mother’s pained face has been heart-wrenching as she’s seen her son’s character dragged 
through the mud after not only your lifetime of public service, but her lifetime of public service 
as well. And I know as a father, there’s been nothing more painful to you than talking to your 
daughters and explaining these attacks that the media is airing.”); id. at 722–23 (statement of 
Sen. Thom Tillis) (“I apologize for what you’re [Kavanaugh] going through right now. . . . 
We’ve [the committee] had an allegation held for nearly 7 weeks that would’ve given us plenty 
of time to investigate. . . . [Democrats] listened in on at least one [previous] interview with you 
and didn’t ask a single question. . . . I think you’ve been treated unfairly, and I’m amazed that . 
. . none of these questions came up when [the allegations were] fully known.”). 
13 See generally Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, supra note 12, at 691–732 (committee 
members’ questioning of Judge Kavanaugh). Senator Ben Sasse had perhaps the most thinly 
veiled concern for Dr. Ford. He mentioned only in passing that he believed her, quickly 
returning to his attack on the Democrats’ timing in bringing the allegations to the attention of 
the committee:  
Did the Ranking Member [Feinstein] already have these allegations for 
[about 35 days when we first met with you?] A recommendation was made 
by the Ranking Member or her staff to Dr. Ford—and, by the way, I think 
Dr. Ford is a victim, and I think she has been through hell, and I am very 
sympathetic to her. . . . But then once the process was closed . . . then this 
was sprung on you? Just want to make sure I have the dates correct. Right? 
Because we have got 35-plus days from all the time that this evidence was 
in the hands, recommendations were made to an outside lawyer, you could 
have handled all this, we could have had this conversation in private in a 
way that did not . . . do crap to his family[.] 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU,
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Dr. Ford’s credibility to auxiliary issues, Senators were able to avoid backlash from 
appearing not to believe Dr. Ford while carving a path to confirm Judge Kavanaugh.14 
Dr. Ford described the difficulty in deciding whether to report what happened to 
her: 
However, once he was selected, and it seemed like he was popular and was a 
sure vote, I was calculating daily the risk-benefit for me of coming forward 
and wondering whether I would just be jumping in front of a train that was 
headed to where it was headed anyway and that I would just be personally 
annihilated.15 
Unfortunately, she was right. Brett Kavanaugh—despite the concern for his 
reputation—has become a lifetime member of the Supreme Court. Dr. Ford described 
having to move to “various secure locales,” sometimes with her family and sometimes 
apart from her family, always with security guards.16 She was constantly harassed, 
received death threats, her work email was hacked, and her personal information was 
posted online.17 Dr. Ford’s statement to the Senate Judiciary shows that to many 
Americans, sex harassment and sexual violence are nothing more than opportunities 
to further harass the victim. These are the kinds of responses Title VII is meant to 
eliminate in the workplace. Unfortunately the legal standards have become more 
tolerant than prohibitive. 
Americans made significant progress between 1991 and 2018 in how we 
understand sex harassment and assault. Despite this progress, the Kavanaugh 
confirmation hearing illustrates that we still have a lot to learn. As a nation, we may 
be more aware of sex harassment, but we’re no closer to stopping it. In 1991, the all-
white, all-male Senate Judiciary Committee lashed out at Anita Hill and blamed her 
for Clarence Thomas’s harassment.18 She was accused of inventing the allegations 
because if the harassment was really that bad, “[w]hy in God’s name” would she not 
just leave her job?19 Dr. Ford, on the other hand, was generally believed by the 
 
Id. at 716. Senator Sasse’s flippant “and, by the way, I think Dr. Ford is a victim,” fulfills his 
obligation to appear concerned about sexual assault victims, without being deterred from his 
mission to confirm Kavanaugh. 
14 For a detailed analysis of Dr. Ford’s and Judge Kavanaugh’s testimony informed by 
gender, class, and race norms, see generally Ann C. McGinley, The Masculinity Mandate: 
#MeToo, Brett Kavanaugh, and Christine Blasey Ford, 23 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 59 (2019). 
15 Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, supra note 12, at 642. 
16 Id. at 638. 
17 Id 
18 Thomas Nomination Hearings, supra note 1, at 123 (testimony of Anita F. Hill, in response 
to a question by Sen. Dennis DeConcini) (“And the fact that you admit that in retrospect maybe 
you should have done something, do you conclude that it is all someone else’s fault, and not 
your own?”). 
19 Id. at 128 (testimony of Anita F. Hill, in response to a question by Sen. Alan K. Simpson). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
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Senate.20 Senators believed that Brett Kavanaugh sexually assaulted her, but they did 
not believe that his conduct was severe enough to disqualify him from taking a seat 
on the Supreme Court.21 After all, he was a drunk teenager, and “[i]f somebody can 
be brought down by accusations like [sexual assault], then . . . every man certainly 
should be worried.”22 
The Senate’s treatment of Anita Hill and Christine Blasey Ford is an appropriate 
analogy for developments in sex harassment law. It has progressed from blaming 
victims to believing them, but that is where the progress stops. A critical part of sex-
based harassment litigation has become employer liability. Courts have slowly 
broadened the definition of sex harassment, but without a basis for holding employers 
liable, a case cannot succeed. Unless an employee is harassed by her supervisor, 
liability rests on the employer’s knowledge, usually through the victim reporting 
harassment—something very few do. Courts’ extreme deference to employers who 
simply have anti-harassment policies, regardless of how effective those policies are, 
has stifled most Title VII claims at summary judgment.23 
The current legal framework creates an impossible standard for many plaintiffs. If 
a victim doesn’t report harassment, her24 employer usually won’t be liable regardless 
of what it knew or should have known. Judges don’t understand the emotional toll 
wrought by sex-based harassment, so they have developed a standard that makes sense 
 
20 See McGinley, supra note 14, at 65–68, 70–71 (discussing responses to Dr. Ford’s 
testimony and analyzing how gender roles influenced those responses). 
21 Id. 
22 Burgess Everett, Flake Opposes Quick Vote on Kavanaugh, Putting Confirmation in 
Doubt, POLITICO (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/16/kavanaugh-
allegation-anonymous-republicans-825855 [https://perma.cc/7P4N-FE93] (quoting “a lawyer 
close to the White House”). 
23 See generally Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of 
Form over Substance, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003); Tristin K. Green, Was Sexual 
Harassment Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128 YALE L.J.F. 152 (2018); Susan Bisom-
Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for 
Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62 (2018); Schultz, supra 
note 3. 
24 I will usually use feminine pronouns to describe victims and masculine pronouns to 
describe harassers throughout this note, but I do not mean to argue that sex harassment is solely 
a women’s issue. Most legal and social science research focuses on women as victims of 
harassment, and women do make up most of the EEOC’s sex harassment charges. See Charges 
Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 2010–FY 2020, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charges-alleging-sex-based-
harassment-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2020 [https://perma.cc/MCN4-3324] (reporting that 
between 2010 and 2020, sex harassment charges to the EEOC were only about 16–17% male). 
But I also realize that stigma affects men differently in a way that might discourage them from 
reporting harassment, perhaps even more so than women. Accordingly, my gender-specific 
pronouns are a way to avoid confusion based on the research available to me, rather than an 
assertion that victims of sex-based harassment are exclusively female and harassers are 
exclusively male. 
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to them25—if it’s bad, report it; if the employer looks into the claim, it was handled 
properly. Unfortunately this view ignores the realities of many plaintiffs and places an 
unrealistic burden on their claims of discrimination. Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed 
in proving their employer was negligent as long as their employers have anti-
harassment policies, and almost all do.26 To give effect to Title VII, courts need to find 
more creative methods of enforcing the statute. I propose imposing mediation in cases 
where courts find that a discriminatory employment practice occurred, but that the 
negligence standard was not met. The plaintiff may be able to receive compensation 
from another source, but the goal of this approach is that hostile work environments 
finally be addressed. Courts have refused to evaluate the effectiveness of the anti-
harassment policies that insulate employers, while noting that harassment is a problem 
in the American workplace.27 The obvious conclusion courts continue to avoid is that 
anti-harassment policies fail to prevent harassment and should not be given the 
deference they have enjoyed. Courts may have to protect employers from monetary 
liability by applying the negligence standard, but they should still implement remedies 
that protect employees. Mediation would serve this purpose if it is focused on 
restorative justice and aimed at changing policies to effectively handle harassment. 
Just like the Senate, courts’ concern for sex harassment is superficial. Despite 
numerous social science studies showing that very few women report sex 
 
25 Justice Ginsburg spent her legal career getting the federal courts to change their 
conceptions of the role of women and sex discrimination. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some 
Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
301, 301–05 (1979) (detailing her successes in the Supreme Court). Likely because of her legal 
career and the overt sex discrimination she faced as a law student and young lawyer, Justice 
Ginsburg took the rare step of delivering an oral dissent in a 2013 case that limited the scope of 
employer liability in Title VII cases, accusing the Court of disregarding the realities of the 
workplace and effectively eliminating remedies for many victims of workplace harassment. 
Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 4:18, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013) (No. 
11-556), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts6/opinion_announcement_audio /24140 
[https://perma.cc/2WSV-QEK2]. Ignoring the background and insight that shaped his 
colleague’s opinion, Justice Alito—who wrote the majority opinion—“pursed his lips, rolled 
his eyes to the ceiling, and shook his head ‘no.’” Garrett Epps, Justice Alito’s Inexcusable 
Rudeness, ATLANTIC (June 24, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/justice-alitos-inexcusable-
rudeness/277163/ [https://perma.cc/ZN73-FYKQ]. Apparently, this is a habit of his, especially 
during the remarks of his female colleagues. Dana Milbank, Opinion, Justice Samuel Alito’s 




26 Grossman, supra note 23, at 19. 
27 See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) (“It is by now well 
recognized that hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors (and, for that matter, 
coemployees) is a persistent problem in the workplace.”) 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
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harassment,28 employers are rarely liable for harassment if the victim failed to file a 
complaint. The effectiveness of a complaint procedure is irrelevant—it just needs to 
exist. As long as employers treat harassed employees like Christine Blasey Ford rather 
than Anita Hill, they are safe from liability. It doesn’t matter that the outcome is the 
same. 
In the next Part, I review case law discussing sex harassment and its shift from 
substance to the formalities of liability. Part III discusses legal theories and scholarship 
that attempts to explain the weakening of Title VII. In Part IV, I review some social 
science concepts relevant to the progression of Title VII and the EEOC’s recent report 
on the research. Part V introduces my approach to restorative mediation before 
concluding in Part VI. 
II. STANDARDS OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEX-BASED HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE 
VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex[.]”29 Sex-based harassment is a form 
of discrimination on the basis of sex30 and violates Title VII when it is “sufficiently 
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an 
abusive working environment.’”31 Severity and pervasiveness are judged both 
subjectively and objectively by considering all of the circumstances in a particular 
case.32 Occasional sexist jokes or the single use of a racial epithet will not meet the 
objective severity/pervasiveness standard. However, “‘[t]he phrase “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment” [in Title VII] evinces a congressional intent 
“to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women” in 
employment,’ which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or 
 
28 See, e.g., CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, REPORT OF THE CO-CHARIS OF THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF 
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 15–16 (2016), https://perma.cc/2K3M-MMRL [hereinafter 
EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT]; Alieza Durana et al., Sexual Harassment: A Severe and Pervasive 
Problem, 
https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/Sexual_Harassment_A_Severe_and_Pervasi
ve_Problem_2018-10-10_190248.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZNS-RBAT] (last updated Sept. 26, 
2018); Lilia M. Cortina & Jennifer L. Berdahl, Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A Decade 
of Research in Review, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 469, 484–85 
(Julian Barling & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2008). 
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
30 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (“Without question, 
when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that 
supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.” (alteration in original)). 
31 Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir 
1982)). 
32 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23 (1993). 
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abusive environment.”33 The focus on severity and pervasiveness moves the legal 
inquiry away from the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Accordingly, Title VII’s 
protections take effect before a victim suffers psychological injury: 
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not 
seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will 
detract from employees’ job performance, discourage employees from 
remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. 
Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the 
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work 
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or 
national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.34 
There are two types of sex-based harassment—harassment that results in a 
“tangible employment action” and harassment that does not.35 The following 
discussion reviews the path of employment discrimination case law leading to this 
distinction and how key decisions have significantly weakened Title VII by 
foreclosing its remedies to plaintiffs in most harassment claims.  
A. Agency Law and the Roots of Employer Liability 
When the Supreme Court recognized sex-based harassment as a form of 
discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, it declined to decide a standard for 
employer liability. The Court rejected a standard of strict liability for hostile work 
environments created by a plaintiff’s supervisor and directed lower courts to consult 
the Restatement (Second) of Agency when evaluating liability.36 Circuit courts 
developed different interpretations of agency principles and the extent to which they 
controlled liability under Title VII.  
For the next three decades, agency law shaped the employer liability framework.37 
Section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency became particularly 
influential in analyzing liability in cases where a plaintiff alleged she was harassed by 
a supervisor.38 Under section 219(2)(d), an employer may be liable for an employee’s 
harassment if the harasser was “aided in accomplishing the [harassment] by the 
 
33 Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64). 
34 Id. at 22. 
35 See infra Section II.A.1. 
36 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
37 See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758–63 (1998) (applying the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency to Title VII cases); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (directing courts 
to consult the Restatement (Second) of Agency for guidance in analyzing employer liability). 
But see Vance, 570 U.S. at 442 (rejecting EEOC guidelines that relied on the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency for a bright-line rule of employer liability). 
38 E.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (discussing the “much-cited § 219(2)”). 
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existence of the agency relation.”39 Supervisory harassers rely on their authority over 
their victims—which exists because of the supervisor’s agency relationship with the 
employer—when harassing a subordinate employee.40 However, relying solely on 
agency principles would make employers strictly liable for supervisors’ harassment, 
something explicitly rejected by Meritor.41 
Relying on guidance from the EEOC, Meritor recognized two different types of 
sex-based harassment—quid pro quo and hostile work environment. Quid pro quo 
harassment reflected an explicit change in the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s 
employment and was linked to some economic injury or employment decision.42 
Hostile work environment harassment, on the other hand, did not require an economic 
injury.43 They fell within the scope of Title VII because the statute “affords employees 
the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, 
and insult.”44 Distinguishing the two types of harassment—rather than acknowledging 
one form of harassment, which did not have to cause economic injury—laid the 
foundation for challenging employer liability on hostile work environment claims.  
The Court was divided 5-4 on the issue of liability, and Justice Marshall’s 
concurring opinion highlighted the problems with regarding one form of harassment 
as a less serious injury.45 He argued that agency principles imposed strict liability on 
an employer when a supervisor harassed a subordinate, regardless of the type of 
harassment the victim suffered.46 Since agency principles attach to the actor, not the 
action, it was illogical to leave open the possibility for two standards of liability when 
a supervisor harassed a subordinate:  
Thus, for example, when a supervisor discriminatorily fires or refuses to 
promote a black employee, that act is, without more, considered the act of the 
employer. The courts do not stop to consider whether the employer otherwise 
had “notice” of the action, or even whether the supervisor had actual 
authority to act as he did. 
 
39 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1958)). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 760; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70. 
42 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64–65. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752–53 (describing the 
lower courts application of the quid pro quo/hostile work environment framework after 
Meritor). 
43 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65–67. 
44 Id. at 65. 
45 See id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens 
all felt that the issue of liability could be properly addressed. Id. Justice Marshall essentially 
argued for exactly what the majority prohibited—strict liability whenever a victim’s harasser is 
her supervisor. Id. at 74–74; cf. id. at 72 (majority opinion). 
46 Id. at 75–76 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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The notice requirement would eventually become the standard for almost all 
harassment cases, even if the harasser was the victim’s supervisor.47 
1. Supervisor Harassment and the Ellerth-Faragher Affirmative Defense 
Confronted by confusion among the lower courts about when plaintiffs could claim 
quid pro quo harassment—usually accompanied by strict liability for the employer—
the Court finally addressed the question of liability in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth 
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.48 In the wake of Meritor, lower courts had applied 
strict liability to supervisor harassment in quid pro quo cases.49 When a supervisor 
created a hostile work environment, lower courts struggled to find an appropriate 
standard, balancing the power dynamic between supervisor and subordinate with the 
absence of an economic injury.50 The Supreme Court discussed agency principles at 
length in Faragher, specifically when an agent’s conduct was within the scope of his 
employment.51 It cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency in stating that the ultimate 
question about whether an action was in the scope of authority—implicating strict 
liability—was whether the injury could be considered part of the normal course of 
business.52 Recognizing the prevalence of sex-based harassment in the workplace, the 
Court considered and rejected argument that “the burden of the untoward behavior 
[should be assigned] to the employer as one of the costs of doing business, . . . rather 
than the victim.”53 Sexual advances, regardless of how severe and pervasive or 
whether they came from a supervisor or a coworker, were, in the Court’s words 
“frolics or detours from the course of employment,” and therefore could not be within 
its scope.54 Another factor in the Court’s analysis was that the same conduct, if 
performed by a coworker, would only lead to employer liability if the plaintiff could 
 
47 See infra Section II.A.2. 
48 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752–53; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). 
Ellerth and Faragher focused on slightly different aspects of employer liability. Faragher 
presented issues about hostile work environment harassment, while the issue in Ellerth was 
whether quid pro quo harassment applied when an adverse action was only threatened, but not 
carried out. Brief for Petitioner at i, Faragher, 524 U.S. 775 (No. 97-282); Brief for Petitioner 
at i, Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (No. 97-569). Since the Court ultimately rejected the quid pro 
quo/hostile work environment classification for harassment claims, the cases adopted the same 
holding. 
49 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752–53. 
50 Id. at 763–64. The confusion among the circuit courts is demonstrated quite well by the 
Seventh Circuit’s en banc opinion in Ellerth, “a decision which produced eight separate 
opinions and no consensus for a controlling rationale.” Id. at 750. 
51 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–801. 
52 Id. at 797. 
53 Id. at 798. 
54 Id. at 798–99. 
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prove the employer was negligent.55 The Court did recognize that a supervisor’s power 
over his victim could make it more difficult for her to refuse, ignore, or report him; 
however, it refused to deviate from the Meritor Court’s position that strict liability 
should not be imposed in all cases of supervisor harassment.56 
Ellerth, after rejecting the term “quid pro quo,” focused on when plaintiffs could 
invoke the higher standard of liability for tangible employment actions.57 Ellerth also 
involved the conduct of a supervisor whose harassment “could be construed as threats 
to deny [the plaintiff] tangible job benefits.”58 However, his threats were never carried 
out and the Court determined that his conduct only amounted to a hostile work 
environment.59 A supervisor must take a tangible employment action to hold the 
employer strictly liable, and since Ellerth’s supervisor never acted on his threats, he 
did not take a tangible employment action.60 Tangible employment actions constitute 
“a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.”61  
The Court determined that the regular negligence standard for hostile work 
environment claims was inappropriate for a supervisor’s harassment that doesn’t result 
in a tangible employment action and responded by creating an affirmative defense.62 
An employer will not be liable for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor 
if it took reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and if the 
victim unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s corrective and 
 
55 Id. at 798–801. 
56 Id. at 802–04. 
57 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752–54 (1998). 
58 Id. at 747–48. 
59 Id. at 754. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 761. Tangible employment actions are not always clear and can vary from circuit to 
circuit. Some courts have held that a bonus is a tangible employment action. See, e.g., Davenport 
v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 891 F.3d 162, 170 (5th Cir. 2018); Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 
819 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Reducing an employee’s hours may be a tangible employment action. See 
Nzabandora v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 749 F. App’x 173, 175 (4th Cir. 2018). 
The Tenth Circuit attempted to clarify the issue in Kramer v. Wasatch County Sheriff’s Office, 
743 F.3d 726, 739 (10th Cir. 2014) with a simple test: “One common sense test that can 
illuminate whether a given harm is a tangible employment action is to ask whether a co-worker 
could have inflicted the same harm as easily. If the answer is yes, then the harm is not a tangible 
employment action.” This inquiry doesn’t address whether an injury is significant enough to be 
considered a tangible employment action, but it may be a good starting point. 
62 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08. 
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preventative measures.63 If an employer has an anti-harassment policy that the victim 
knows about, but unreasonably fails to use, an employer will not be liable.64  
2. The Negligence Standard 
If an employer meets both elements of the Ellerth-Faragher defense—that it acted 
reasonably with regard to corrective action and the victim did not—then the 
employer’s liability will be judged under a negligence standard, meaning the plaintiff 
must prove the employer knew or should have known about the harassment and failed 
to take appropriate action.65 This standard is also applied to cases where the victim’s 
harasser is a coworker or a third party, like a patient or customer.66 The holding of 
Ellerth and Faragher expressly found that promulgation of an anti-harassment policy 
with complaint procedures was relevant to the first element of the defense and an 
employee’s failure to use a known complaint procedure was relevant to the second.67 
The negligence standard in harassment cases has become so closely related to anti-
harassment policies that having an anti-harassment policy has essentially become the 
standard of liability.68  
 
63 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08. For a discussion of the 
reasonableness requirement when it comes to reporting sexual harassment, see L. Camille 
Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 
711, 717 (2007) (noting that courts often read “and” as “or” when applying the Ellerth-Faragher 
framework, allowing employers to escape liability if both parties acted reasonably). 
64 Federal courts have a skewed view of what is reasonable. Seventy-five percent of victims 
who reported harassment faced some form of retaliation. EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 28, at 16. Nevertheless, courts generally find that fear of retaliation is unreasonable unless 
the victim can articulate specific grounds for her fear. See, e.g., Minarsky v. Susquehanna City, 
895 F.3d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that the victim’s fear was specific, and not 
“unsubstantiated”); Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (same). Notably, as of June 
1, 2017, the federal judiciary was only 34% female (women represented 34% of district court 
judges, 37% of circuit court judges, and 33% of Supreme Court Justices). BARRY J. MCMILLION, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: A PROFILE OF SELECT 
CHARACTERISTICS 4–5, 15–16 (2017). 
65 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08. 
66 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2021). 
67 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08. 
68 See generally Joanna L. Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back: A Retrospective on 
Sexual Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1042 (2015) (“The [Ellerth-Faragher] defense, 
which carves out an exception to a general rule of automatic liability, represents a key shift in 
Title VII law from an emphasis on substance to an emphasis on procedure. The question is not 
whether employers have successfully prevented or responded to problems of harassment, but 
whether they have erected an internal system designed to do those things—whether successful 
or well-engineered or neither.”); see also id. at 1045 (describing the short reporting time paired 
with weakened protection from retaliation as a deterrent to even filing a complaint). 
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The Supreme Court again made liability harder to prove in 2013 when it decided 
Vance v. Ball State University, which limited who could be considered a supervisor.69 
All other employees were deemed “coworkers,” invoking the negligence standard.70 
The Court noted that its decision was beneficial to all parties because it created a bright 
line in determining who qualifies as a supervisor and there would no longer be the 
need for lengthy, fact-sensitive inquiries or confusing jury instructions.71 Since 
discrimination claims are inherently fact-sensitive inquiries and the point of Title VII 
was “to strike at the entire spectrum”72 of workplace discrimination, choosing to limit 
plaintiffs’ claims for the sake of expediency illustrates the Court’s hostility toward 
harassment claims.  
B. Title VII Jurisprudence as a Superficial Concern 
The Supreme Court’s decisions reveal that the Court, much like the Senate at the 
Kavanaugh hearing,73 is concerned only with appearing to take sex harassment 
seriously. There is a noticeable shift in the Court’s language once it begins considering 
employer liability instead of the substantive elements of harassment. When 
considering whether actionable harassment needed to prove a tangible injury, the 
Court responded forcefully in the negative: 
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not 
seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will 
 
69 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). According to the dissent, this strict 
definition of a supervisor “misses the forest for the trees” and ignores the reality of modern 
workplace hierarchy, which has many levels of supervisor other than those who can take 
tangible employment actions. Id. at 457 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the 
Court should have adopted the EEOC’s guidelines, which defined a supervisor either as 
someone who had the ability to take tangible employment action, or someone who oversaw 
employees’ daily activities. Id. at 451. 
70 Sometimes a “coworker” doesn’t have the authority to take tangible employment action 
against the victim, but the employer essentially rubber stamps any decision he makes. This is 
known as the “cat’s paw” theory of liability, and employers usually cannot escape liability in 
these cases. See generally Crystal Jackson-Kaloz, Note, Cat Scratch Fever: The Spread of the 
Cat’s Paw Doctrine in the Second Circuit, 67 CATH. U. L. REV. 410 (2018) (discussing the cat’s 
paw doctrine and its application to employer liability under Title VII). Delegating supervisory 
work to an employee might make them a “supervisor” under the Vance standard even if the 
power to hire, fire, promote, or demote lies elsewhere. Vance, 570 U.S. at 447. 
71 Vance, 570 U.S. at 431–33, 441–45. The Court specifically mentioned that “[c]ourts and 
commentators alike have opined on the need for reasonably clear jury instructions in 
employment discrimination cases.” Id. at 444. This concern is arguably less important that the 
need for a legal framework that’s relevant in an actual work environment, instead of one based 
on what judges think happens in a work environment. The need for clear jury instructions seems 
disingenuous considering the rate at which employment discrimination cases get dismissed—a 
rate which the Vance decision will likely increase. 
72 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
73 See supra Part I. 
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detract from employees’ job performance, discourage employees from 
remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. 
Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the 
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work 
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or 
national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.74 
Once employer liability was at issue, however, the Court didn’t find Title VII to 
be quite so protective: 
Although Meritor suggested the limitation on employer liability stemmed 
from agency principles, the Court acknowledged other considerations might 
be relevant as well. For example, Title VII is designed to encourage the 
creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. 
Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer’s effort to create 
such procedures, it would effect Congress’ intention to promote conciliation 
rather than litigation in the Title VII context. To the extent limiting employer 
liability could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it 
becomes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII’s deterrent 
purpose. As we have observed, Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, and the considerations which animate that doctrine 
would also support the limitation of employer liability in certain 
circumstances.75 
Faced with the consequences of permitting a broad range of conduct to fall within 
the purview of Title VII, the Court determined that the victims of harassment should 
bear some responsibility in maintaining a harassment-free workplace. Title VII’s 
purpose has gone from “strik[ing] at the entire spectrum” of workplace 
discrimination76 to chipping away at it modestly, but only in certain circumstances. 
III. ARRIVING AT NEGLIGENCE 
While Vance was a blow to Title VII protections because it limited the definition 
of “supervisor,” its practical effect is likely minimal. Courts have largely interpreted 
the Ellerth-Faragher defense to mean that if an employee does not report harassment 
and the employer has an anti-harassment policy that the employee knew about, the 
employer has proven the defense.77 This Part discusses the history of how judges have 
treated Title VII claims, introduces legal theories about sex harassment, and discusses 




74 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (emphasis added). 
75 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (citations omitted). 
76 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. 
77 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 3, at 42. 
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A. Title VII and Summary Judgment 
Title VII’s purpose was to “strike at the entire spectrum” of workplace 
discrimination.78 Instead of holding employers responsible for a broad range of illegal 
conduct, however, Title VII jurisprudence has largely carved out exceptions to 
employer liability. While the first few years of employment discrimination law were 
promising, judges eventually began treating Title VII claims with increasing 
skepticism and hostility.  
In the first decade after Title VII was passed, federal courts “created a Title VII 
jurisprudence that expressed our nation’s highest ideals of openness and equality,” at 
least in race discrimination claims.79 In disparate impact claims, for example, judges 
were unlikely to accept an employer’s argument that the racial segregation of its 
workforce was a result of the protected class’s lack of interest in certain jobs.80 In sex 
discrimination claims, however, judges more readily accepted the lack of interest 
defense to explain gender segregation and by the late 1970s, were more willing to 
accept the defense in race discrimination cases.81 When courts framed segregated 
workplaces as individual preference beyond an employer’s control, they “privatized 
job segregation and placed it beyond the reach of the law.”82  
In the mid-1990s, several employment law scholars noted with concern the 
increased use of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.83 While 
 
78 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. 
79 Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study 
of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1073, 1181 (1992). 
80 Id. at 1076 & n.9, 1181. 
81 Id. at 1181. 
82 Id. Schultz and Petterson powerfully conclude: 
Throughout history, the dominant culture has rationalized women’s 
employment in low-paying, dead-end jobs as the expression of their own 
preordained preferences for suitably “feminine” work. Similarly, our 
society has rationalized minorities’ inferior economic status as the 
reflection of their own lack of initiative. Whereas Title VII jurisprudence 
once rejected and stood in tension with such cultural attitudes, it now 
incorporates them to a large extent. . . . Unless the courts change course, 
Title VII may someday be perceived as a short-lived, but failed, experiment 
in equality. 
Id. Their description of federal courts rationalizing discrimination by incorporating cultural 
attitudes into Title VII jurisprudence certainly rings true for sex-based harassment. I fear the 
hands-off approach adopted by the courts has led us dangerously close to “short-lived, but 
failed, experiment in equality” territory. 
83 Deborah Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
2229, 2237 (1995); Ann McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper 
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 243 (1993); 
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summary judgment became more common in all cases in response to the Supreme 
Court’s 1986 decisions on civil procedure,84 federal courts initially recognized that 
employment discrimination claims, which involve the delicate balancing of facts, 
present triable issues of fact and should rarely be decided at the summary judgment 
stage.85 However, granting summary judgment became a tool of clearing dockets, and 
judges began to use summary judgment even in employment discrimination cases.86 
And these cases were being decided overwhelmingly in favor of employers.87 A 2001 
study comparing discrimination cases with insurance and personal injury cases found 
that ninety-eight percent of employment discrimination cases were decided for 
employers during the pre-trial stage, compared to sixty-six percent of defendants’ 
dispositive motions being granted for other types of cases.88 A recent study of 
employment law cases filed in the Northern District of Georgia between 2010 and 
2017 found that plaintiffs in sex harassment claims lost on the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment twice as often as other types of employment cases.89 
Employment discrimination cases in general have had limited success surviving 
summary judgment,90 and cases with female plaintiffs fare just as poorly in non-
 
Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 753 (1995). 
84 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of 
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported 
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material 
fact.”); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (finding that the defendant does not 
have to support its summary judgment motion with evidence negating the plaintiff’s claim); 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 476 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (establishing 
heightened summary judgment standards for the nonmovant in complex factual situations). 
85 See Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’, and No Summary Judgment” 
Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 685, 687–88 (2012–2013). Judge Bennett states that between the 1970s and 1990s, 
“[m]any circuits had a clearly stated preference against summary judgment in employment 
discrimination cases, especially disparate treatment cases, because they almost always turn on 
delicate factual nuances of intent.” Id. at 688. 
86 Id. at 688–89; see also Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The 
dangers of robust use of summary judgement to clear trial dockets are particularly acute in 
current sex discrimination cases.”).  
87 Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 555, 560 (2001). 
88 Id.  
89 Charlotte S. Alexander, #MeToo and the Litigation Funnel, 23 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
17, 46–47 (2019). 
90 Helen Hershkoff & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Sex, Trump, and Constitutional Change, 34 
CONST. COMMENT. 43, 102 (2019) (explaining that a 2007 report of the Federal Judicial Center 
revealed that 77% of discrimination cases were dismissed in whole or in part at the summary 
judgment stage, compared with 70% of other civil rights cases, 61% of torts cases, and 59% of 
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discrimination claims.91 Whether to grant summary judgment involves some amount 
of discretion, and a review of the federal courts’ Gender Bias task force reports from 
the late 1990s revealed that most sex discrimination claims were dismissed at some 
point before being allowed to proceed to the jury.92 More recently, a study of 500 
Equal Pay Act cases determined that dismissing wage discrimination claims at the 
summary judgment stage “is the modus operandi for most federal courts.”93 Jurors 
may be more sensitive to workplace realities than judges, but the current legal 
framework prevents many cases from reaching them.94 
A small but vocal cohort of judges have remained committed to more fact-sensitive 
inquiries in employment discrimination cases,95 particularly in sex discrimination 
cases where the standards of acceptable workplace conduct change rapidly.96 
Unfortunately, this opinion usually voiced in dissenting opinions when it is voiced at 
all.97 The increasingly difficult standard for discrimination claims is likely the result 
of many factors; one voiced by many commentators suggests that after the first ten to 
 
contract cases); B. Glenn George, Theory and Practice: Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 727, 728 (2007) (“Using the [Ellerth-Faragher] 
affirmative defense on liability has proven an effective shield to bypass consideration of the 
harassment itself and avoid trial altogether. Even with modest evidence of past prevention 
efforts, employers are often granted summary judgment on the liability issue, thereby mooting 
any debate on what constitutes sexual harassment within the meaning of the statute.”). 
91 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 711 (2007) (“There are many subtle ways in which judicial 
decision making with respect to summary judgment can be problematic: in judicial evaluations 
of female plaintiff credibility . . . ; in judicial assessment of the facts of the case or the strength 
of novel claims or rejection of novel arguments ‘as a matter of law’; in judicial determination 
of whether a ‘reasonable juror’ could find for the plaintiff; and in judicial diminution and 
trivialization of the seriousness of harms suffered by women plaintiffs seeking redress in 
court.”). 
92 Id. at 710. 
93 Hershkoff & Schneider, supra note 90, at 102. Interestingly, female judges dismissed pay 
discrimination claims less frequently than male judges. Id. at 102–03. 
94 It’s also important to remember that only 34% of federal district court judges are female. 
MCMILLION, supra note 64, at 15. While being female doesn’t necessarily correspond with 
increased sensitivity to sex harassment claims, there is at least some evidence that female judges 
may be more sensitive to gender inequality than their male counterparts. See Hershkoff & 
Schneider, supra note 90, at 102–03. 
95 See Bennett, supra note 85, at 690–93 (Judge Bennett discussing his own resistance to 
summary judgment and that of some of his colleagues across the country). 
96 Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable 
People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 793 (2002); Gallagher v. Delaney, 
139 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
defendant-employer in a sex harassment case). 
97 See Bennett, supra note 85, at 691–93. 
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twenty years of Title VII litigation, judges started to assume that the law had 
effectively cured the structural ills Title VII targeted it targeted.98 When discrimination 
does occur, judges see it not as an institutional problem, but rather a problem created 
by one bad actor.99 Title VII has advanced workplaces enough that employers know 
to fire or discipline those they see as bad actors, and judges equate discipline with 
reasonable corrective action by employers, failing to require any structural changes 
within the organization. This approach fails to address the root of the problem because 
it does not address the culture within a workplace that allows harassment to occur. 
B. The Path to a Weakened Title VII 
Scholars have raised numerous concerns about the direction of employment 
discrimination litigation in federal courts as more cases are dismissed without the fact-
sensitive inquiry they require.100 Even as early as 1975, the Supreme Court began 
discussing racial discrimination as a thing of the past.101 Much of the scholarly analysis 
has focused on inadequacies in the legal framework and a disconnect between the legal 
framework and reality.102 
One of the biggest problems with sex harassment litigation is that courts only see 
sex harassment as an individual problem, thereby reducing a complex, systemic 
problem to little more than workplace bullying.103 Sex-based harassment is not solely 
 
98 Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 575, 585 (2003); 
TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE 
AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW 3 (2017); Schultz & Petterson, supra note 79, at 
1179. 
99 Zimmer, supra note 98, at 593; Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 
1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407, 1411–12 (1990). See generally GREEN, supra note 98. 
100 See supra Section III.A. 
101 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) (“The power to award backpay 
was bestowed by Congress, as part of a complex legislative design directed at a historic evil of 
national proportions.” (emphasis added)); id. at 417–18 (“It is the reasonably certain prospect 
of a backpay award that ‘provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to 
self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so 
far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country’s 
history.’”) (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(emphasis added)). 
102 See, e.g., Mark R. Bandsuch, Ten Troubles with Title VII and Trait Discrimination Plus 
One Simple Solution (A Totality of the Circumstances Framework), 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 965 
(2009).  
103 See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women’s Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 48 (1990) (explaining that when courts view sex harassment as a 
systemic problem rather than an individual one, they are more willing to find a cause of action); 
GREEN, supra note 98, at 3 (blaming the “personaliz[ation] of discrimination” for the decrease 
in employer liability); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the 
Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 79, 139–40 (1989) (explaining that discrimination framework is designed to address 
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individual harm, and it is rarely caused by a single person. Employers are responsible 
for the culture of a workplace and set the example of either tolerating or actively 
prohibiting harassment.104 Instead of holding employers responsible for 
discriminatory cultures that foster harassment, courts simply refuse to impose any 
liability. Many commentators have remarked that after the first decade of Title VII 
litigation, judges believed that discrimination had been successfully purged from the 
American workplace and any remaining harassment was the result of individual bad 
actors, not systemic discrimination.105 
Professor Alan Freeman calls this focus on the individual the “perpetrator 
perspective” and found that it is the dominant view in American legal culture.106 The 
perpetrator perspective assesses Title VII cases through “timeless and abstract norms, 
unsullied by history or social reality.”107 The contrary view, called the “victim 
perspective,” focuses on the purpose of antidiscrimination law—outlawing 
discrimination.108 If the same conditions that existed before an antidiscrimination law 
was passed still exist after discrimination was prohibited, the law is ineffective.109 
Legal standards create structures that force jurors to focus intensely on secondary 
issues, such as performance evaluations, which draws their attention away from the 
overall tone of a workplace.110 Emphasizing a more holistic approach would allow 
jurors to determine whether some of the objective standards are merely examples of a 
hostile work environment; for example, whether the masculine overtones of a 
workplace cause dissatisfaction among female workers and contribute to poor 
performance.111 
It is a lot easier to focus on comparing what was stated in [the plaintiff’s] and 
others’ performance evaluations than it is to decide whether a gendered 
 
individual acts of discrimination within a system, but accepts the system as is instead of 
adopting a new system or set of rights in a workplace). 
104 See GREEN, supra note 98, at 3 (“[E]ven when organizations do not formally sanction 
discrimination, they can incite discrimination through the structures, practices, and cultures that 
they create and maintain.”). 
105 See, e.g., Schultz & Petterson, supra note 79, at 1181; Zimmer, supra note 98, at 584–85 
(“The decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the civil rights movement, and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 came amidst critical and exciting times. But that period is long over. Now that it is, 
one reaction is to let the problems of discrimination regress, leaving society unsympathetic 
toward all workers, including women, African Americans, and members of other minority 
groups.” (footnotes omitted)). 
106 Freeman, supra note 99, at 1411–12. 
107 Id. at 1412. 
108 Id. at 1411. 
109 Id.   
110 GREEN, supra note 98, at 17. 
111 Id. 
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culture may have affected [the plaintiff’s] interactions with her colleagues, 
her colleagues’ interactions with other male employees, even her own un-
team-like behavior, all of which may have influenced the content of the 
evaluations in the first place. But if the male-dominated dynamics [in a work 
environment] played a role in how [the plaintiff] and other women were 
evaluated . . . should we expect [their employer] to change those dynamics?112 
Of course, as discussed in Section III.A, most employment discrimination cases 
don’t make it to the jury. While some courts fail to see employer knowledge in many 
hostile work environment suits, others dismiss cases for failing to allege sufficiently 
severe and pervasive conduct.113 Many states have adopted statutes similar to Title VII 
that prohibit a broader range of conduct and don’t have as rigorous standards for 
satisfying the severe and pervasive element.114 However, even stronger, less 
employer-friendly state laws fail to encourage more than superficial compliance.115 
Although “severe and pervasive” is a subjective standard determined that offers 
plaintiffs little guidance, the bigger problem is the overwhelming dismissal of most 
Title VII cases.116 Courts dismiss cases because they believe discrimination is 
adequately prevented by Title VII, a belief grounded in the over-emphasized 
individual nature of discrimination.117 This approach “keep[s] us from asking bigger 
questions, and ultimately from seeking bolder and more effective solutions.”118 Sex 
harassment law is stuck in a phase of superficial compliance with a legal framework 






112 Id. at 17–18. 
113 See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS 
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 30–31 (2017). 
114 See Kate Webber Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The Lessons of Fox 
News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 463, 492–96 (2018) (using 
Gretchen Carlson’s lawsuit against Fox News for the continued harassment she suffered by her 
male colleagues as an example of conduct that might fail under Title VII but may have been 
successful under the complementary New York City Human Rights Law). 
115 Id. at 466. 
116 See supra Section III.A. 
117 See Jason R. Bent, Hope for Zimmerism: Overcoming the Empathy Problem in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 277, 282 (2016) (“Notions about the 
general prevalence of discrimination, based not on any empirical evidence but instead on judges' 
own gut feelings or perceptions, might not just be affecting the outcome of individual cases, 
they might be affecting the development of the law.”). 
118 Green, supra note 23, at 154. 
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IV. ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICIES AS THE CONTROLLING STANDARD 
As mentioned above, anti-harassment policies and training do not prevent 
harassment.119 When the EEOC Commissioner, after studying 30 years of social 
science data, reached this conclusion in 2016, she described the result as “jaw-
dropping.”120 Federal courts might have been just as surprised as the EEOC at this 
conclusion, but it hardly excuses their failure to undertake any reasonableness analysis 
of anti-harassment policies. This laissez-faire approach to employment discrimination 
is rendering Title VII useless and rewarding policies designed merely to avoid 
litigation.121 “Despite the fact that 98 percent of companies say they have sexual 
harassment policies and many provide sexual harassment training . . . the problem of 
sexual harassment persists.”122 Workplaces with persistent harassment have negative 
effects not just for the victim, but for other employees, and for the workforce at 
large.123 Employees are unhappy and unproductive—regardless of whether they feel 
they are personally being harassed.124 Victims often develop depression, anxiety, and 
physical illness, such as high blood pressure, gastrointestinal problems, and chronic 
headaches.125 Social science provides helpful guidance for setting minimum standards 
for employers to adopt in assessing the prevalence of workplace harassment.   
Virtually all employers have adopted anti-harassment policies to insulate 
themselves from negligence claims in response to Ellerth and Faragher.126 While 
 
119 See generally Susan Bisom-Rapp, What We Know About Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law After Fifty Years of Trying, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 337 (2018); Emily Leskinen et 
al., Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-Based Harassment at Work, 
35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (2010); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor 
Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and 
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001); Bisom-
Rapp, supra note 23; Justine E. Tinkler, Resisting the Enforcement of Sexual Harassment Law, 
37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2012). 
120 Bisom-Rapp, supra note 23, at 63. 
121 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, What’s the Point of Sexual Harassment Training? Often, 




122 Durana et al., supra note 28, at 17. 
123 EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 18. 
124 Id. at 21–22. 
125 Bernadette Baum, Workplace Sexual Harassment in the “Me Too” Era: The Unforeseen 
Consequences of Confidential Settlement Agreements, 31 J. BUS. & BEHAV. SCIS. 4, 11 (2019). 
126 See Grossman, supra note 23, at 19; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–
08 (1998) (explaining that the existence of an anti-harassment policy is relevant to the first 
element of the affirmative defense, and that an employee’s failure to utilize the procedure will 
usually satisfy the second element). 
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supervisor harassment may implicate strict liability regardless of an employer’s anti-
harassment policy, use of a complaint procedure is virtually the only way to satisfy 
the liability requirement in cases of coworker harassment.127 The existence of anti-
harassment policies has become critical to employers because Courts typically 
consider the existence and distribution of a policy to be the end of the analysis and 
forego any discussion about whether the employer’s policy and complaint procedure 
was reasonable or whether the plaintiff’s failure to file a complaint was reasonable.128 
Professor Tristin Green refers to the practice of legalizing illegal discrimination, 
including harassment, as “discrimination laundering.”129 
Anti-harassment policies, complaint procedures, and harassment training all fail to 
prevent harassment.130 Unfortunately, Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher have created 
and reinforced a culture of superficial compliance with employment discrimination 
law.131 The Court did not expressly require employers to adopt anti-harassment 
policies, but policies were the only factor it mentioned as being relevant to the 
affirmative defense.132 Although some courts developed standards for analyzing 
complaint procedures in the early 1980s and 1990s,133 most have abandoned that 
 
127 See, e.g., Wierngo v. Akal Sec., Inc., 580 F. App’x 364, 367, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(finding that employer could not be liable for sex-based harassment when the victim failed to 
complain specifically about the instances of harassment); Schaefer v. Peralta, No. 16-17784, 
2019 WL 5191000, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2019) (rejecting employer liability when a county 
employee failed to report harassment, even though her harasser was the chief county executive); 
cf. Minarsky v. Susqueanna Cnty., 895 F.3d 303, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding a question of 
fact as to employer’s knowledge of harasser’s conduct when harasser also harassed women who 
had the power to discipline him, but didn’t). 
128 Under the Ellerth-Faragher framework, an employer should still be liable if both 
employer and victim acted unreasonably, but courts treat the victim’s unreasonableness as a win 
for the employer. Hébert, supra note 63, at 716–17. Although the presumption of liability does 
not attach to co-worker harassment, there is no reason courts should not make some inquiry into 
the reasonableness of the parties. In light of continually high rates of sex harassment despite 
employers almost universally having anti-harassment policies, it would almost make more sense 
to presume that a policy isn’t reasonable. 
129 See generally GREEN, supra note 98, at 1. 
130 See sources cited supra note 119. 
131 Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social 
Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 273, 280–81 (2001) (“[W]hile the burden of proof for [the Ellerth-Faragher] 
defense is obviously on the employer, it appears that there may be an implicit burden on an 
employee who fails to use the complaint system in place.”). 
132 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
133 See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that policies must be 
“reasonably calculated to end the harassment”); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 
1991) (breaking the analysis into two prongs—whether the policy was reasonable and whether 
it adequately deterred illegally discriminatory conduct). 
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approach.134 Many courts agree that anti-harassment policies must be both “reasonably 
calculated to end the harassment”135 and adequately deter illegally discriminatory 
conduct.136 However, compliance with these procedures seems to have become more 
legally significant than a substantive analysis of the conduct they aim to prohibit.137 
The development of the legal framework has followed the sociological concept of 
legal endogeneity, in which a law acquires meaning from the social arenas it seeks to 
regulate.138 In the face of new laws or requirements, organizations adopt new 
procedures and policies to create symbolic compliance; this symbolic compliance 
becomes the institutional norm, which courts then associate with actual compliance.139 
Endogeneity has three phases: reference, relevance, and deference.140 First, mere 
reference of organizational structures, like complaint procedures, reflects the extent to 
which the structure has become the norm in work environments.141 The more reference 
is made, of course, the more a concept becomes part of case law, taking on more 
significance. This first stage was already in process by the time the Supreme Court 
decided Meritor, evidenced by the Court’s brief discussion of anti-harassment policies 
as potential limit on liability in other cases.142 In the second stage, a structure becomes 
relevant to a legal framework without being required as judges begin to consider the 
presence of structures as potentially indicative of compliance with the legal 
framework.143 The relevance stage for anti-harassment policies corresponds with the 
decisions in Ellerth and Faragher when the Court found anti-harassment policies 
would “normally suffice” to satisfy the affirmative defense.144 The final stage is 
deference, where “structures become so closely associated with rationality and 
nondiscriminatory treatment that judges no longer scrutinize their quality or evaluate 
 
134 See Grossman, supra note 23, at 4–5 (arguing that courts ignore the causes of harassment 
and the effectiveness of preventative measures, and instead reward employers who “pay lip 
service to” the legal framework, even if those employers maintain workplaces with perpetual 
harassment and discrimination). 
135 Katz, 709 F.2d at 256. 
136 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. 
137 Grossman, supra note 23, at 4. 
138 Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to 
Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOCIO. 888, 890 (2011). 
139 Id. at 898. 
140 Id. at 893. 
141 Id. 
142 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62, 71–72 (1986). 
143 Edelman et al., supra note 138, at 893–94. 
144 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 808 (1998). 
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whether they actually operate to reduce discrimination.”145 Instead, judges give 
deference to the structure “irrespective of whether [it] actually protects employees 
from discrimination.”146 The end result is that employers—the subject of Title VII 
regulation—define the meaning of compliance with its terms.147 
The final stage of deference has not been illustrated in any one Supreme Court 
decision,148 but is apparent from the current state of Title VII claims.149 At some point, 
Title VII was reduced to a single element: the presence of a superficial policy used to 
insulate the employer from liability. The statutory language didn’t change, but the 
legal framework did. The courts’ increased deference to anti-harassment policies is 
illogical in light of the increasing body of social science literature establishing that 
these policies are ineffective—and at times—harmful.150  
A. Enforcement: Leaving the Policing to the Policed 
As discussed above, many courts require anti-harassment policies to meet certain 
standards, but the deference to employers renders the standard virtually 
meaningless.151 One problem with anti-harassment procedures is that they frame 
harassment as an interpersonal problem related to business operation.152 The response 
 
145 Edelman et al., supra note 138, at 894. 
146 Id.   
147 Bisom-Rapp, supra note 23, at 65 (citing LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC COMPLIANCE 12–14 (2016)). 
148 But see GREEN, supra note 98, at 74–75 (describing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 
U.S. 338, 342 (2011) as the climax of organizational innocence). 
149 The concept of “deference” is interesting here. The Vance Court declined to give Chevron 
deference to the EEOC’s guidelines, which would have expanded employer liability and 
rewarded effective anti-harassment policies. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 451 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (deferring to administrative agencies and their rulemaking power). Since 
then, courts have given more deference to employers’ anti-harassment policies than the 
Supreme Court gave to the EEOC. 
150 See Theodore L. Hayes et al., Coffee and Controversy: How Applied Psychology Can 
Revitalize Sexual Harassment and Racial Discrimination Training, 13 INDUS. & ORG. PSYCH. 
117, 121–22 (2020) (describing at best the neutral effects of discrimination training); see also 
EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 15–17; Durana et al., supra note 28, at 16–17. 
See generally Afroditi Pina et al., An Overview of the Literature on Sexual Harassment: 
Perpetrator, Theory, and Treatment Issues, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 126 (2009). 
Courts shouldn’t have to turn to social science, however. It has become apparent as a matter of 
common knowledge that workplace harassment is a significant problem in America. Concluding 
that anti-harassment policies are ineffective at preventing harassment shouldn’t be a substantial 
leap. 
151 See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text. 
152 Edelman et al., supra note 138, at 899. 
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to harassment, like the harassment itself, is framed as a managerial concern to be 
handled by the employer.153 So framed, judges feel that subjecting employers’ policies 
to more scrutiny would be an unreasonable intrusion of the workplace.154 
Since anti-harassment policies are internal documents, they are designed to protect 
the employer.155 Accordingly, there is no incentive for employers to address the 
environment that allows harassment to continue, which is the root of the problem. 
Instead, anti-harassment policies address harassment on a complaint-by-complaint 
basis, and as long as each individual complaint was responded to reasonably, the 
employer has performed its obligations under Title VII.156 This piecemeal approach is 
little comfort to the victim who continues to work in a hostile environment in between 
each “reasonably-handled” complaint.  
1. Same Company, Different Outcomes: The Tale of CRST Expedited 
One recent example focusing on individual harassment comes from the Northern 
District of Iowa, which held that an employer was not liable for the harassment of 
several female truck drivers by their male co-drivers, despite an ineffective policy that 
failed to address widespread harassment.157 The workforce in Sellars v. CRST 
Expedited, Inc. was overwhelmingly male.158 When male drivers were paired with 
 
153 Id. 
154 See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 770 (1998) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“Sexual harassment is simply not something that employers can wholly prevent 
without taking extraordinary measures—constant video and audio surveillance, for example—
that would revolutionize the workplace in a manner incompatible with a free society.”). 
155 See Edelman, supra note 121. Grossman, supra note 23, at 14 describes the delicate 
balance employers face in discouraging harassment and disseminating information about the 
complaint procedure without encouraging reporting too strongly. The reason not to encourage 
reporting is that an employee’s unreasonable failure to notify her employer of the harassment 
will ensure the employer avoids liability under Ellerth-Faragher so long as it had a reasonable 
policy. Id. 
156 GREEN, supra note 98, at 109. 
157 Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 803, 833 (N.D. Iowa 2019). The 
trucking company, CRST, was involved in multiple lawsuits for sex discrimination and 
harassment—in fact, much of the district court’s decision in this case was based on a standard 
set out by the Eighth Circuit in another CRST sex harassment case. See generally id. The district 
court did not find any merit to the plaintiffs’ argument that CRST’s ineffective policy affected 
the company’s liability. Id. at 837. Despite the numerous lawsuits facing the company for the 
same behavior, the court concluded that “it was not reasonably foreseeable that plaintiffs would 
continue to be harassed by [another] co-driver” after being un-paired from their initial harasser. 
Id. 
158 See Sellars, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 808 (noting that of the 500 lead drivers employed by 
CRST, only 25 were female); see also id. at 808 n.2 (explaining that only 13% of all drivers in 
August 2016 were female). 
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female drivers, isolation and lack of supervision contributed to a toxic culture.159 The 
employer recognized these risk factors—it had a specialized procedure detailing what 
should happen when female drivers were harassed by their male co-drivers.160  
The Sellars court held that it would be unfair to hold the employer liable.161 Circuit 
precedent required an employer’s policy and response to be reasonably calculated to 
end harassment, but a policy that failed to end harassment could still be reasonably 
calculated to do so.162 The court focused on the fact that female drivers were harassed 
by different male drivers each time, and that CRST had no knowledge as to the specific 
male driver’s harassment before it occurred.163 The plaintiffs’ argument that CRST 
failed to create an environment free from harassment, in the judge’s opinion, would 
amount to strict liability.164 
The plaintiffs presented evidence that CRST’s employee relations manager and the 
company’s human resources department performed minimal investigation, rarely tried 
to contact witnesses more than once, and in some cases concluded investigations on 
the same day they were filed.165 Harassment was pervasive and caused by several 
employees, who were rarely disciplined,166 despite the employee relations manager’s 
 
159 Id. at 831.  
160 See id. at 810–11 (describing the policy). CRST’s policy was concerning for many 
reasons. Most notably, it would remove the female driver when she complained of sex 
harassment—not her male harasser, who would often continue driving. Id. at 811. Drivers are 
paid per mile, so the victims had the choice of forfeiting much of their earnings for the trip or 
remaining in a hostile environment. Id. at 809, 812. There is an argument to be made that the 
existence of this more specialized section of the anti-harassment policy should not be used 
against CRST because courts should encourage such policies attempting to stop harassment, 
rather than punish employers when such policies are ineffective. This may be a good argument 
under tort law, which shares similar principles, but it clashes with the purpose of Title VII, 
which is to promote effective anti-harassment policies. See Martha Chamallas, Two Very 
Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1330 
(2014) (“When we examine the contrasting structural models of liability found in tort versus 
Title VII and remind ourselves of tort law’s well-known propensity for insulating employers in 
employee suits for compensation, the wisdom of importing [tort] law [to Title VII] is 
immediately called into question.”). 
161 Sellars, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 837.  
162 Id. at 832 (citing Engel v. Rapid City Sch. Dist., 506 F.3d 1118, 1125 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
163 Id. at 834–35, 837. 
164 Id. at 834–35. According to the court, policies need not deter other harassers from 
harassment—just those who have already been caught. Id. at 835–37. 
165 Id. at 819, 821–26. The employee relations manager also admitted that the problem was 
not under control and even suggested putting cameras in the truck cabs.  
166 Id. at 813–14. Generally, the “discipline” would be that the harasser’s status would be 
changed to “male only” in the internal system, preventing him from working with female 
drivers. Id. at 814. Since that left him with 87% of drivers to work with, this can hardly be 
considered disciplinary action. Id. at 808 n.2.  
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admission that the problem of sex harassment was not under control.167 Nevertheless, 
because CRST had a policy that it followed, it was protected from liability. 
Policies that fail to remedy a company’s toxic culture cannot deter any one of its 
employees from becoming a part of that culture. The Ninth Circuit took a similar view 
in Anderson v. CRST, International, Inc., a sex-based harassment case against the 
same company involving remarkably similar facts.168 Unlike the Sellars court, the 
Anderson court reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to 
CRST, in part because the plaintiff presented evidence that CRST took no action to 
prevent future action.169 The plaintiff in Anderson was harassed by her co-driver and 
the harassment ended when she was separated from him.170 The court found that CRST 
could still be liable for a hostile work environment if its policies and procedures failed 
to deter harassment, regardless of whether the plaintiff’s harassment stopped.171 
B. Focusing on Individual Acts 
When a court focuses on individual acts of and responses to harassment, it “misses 
the forest for the trees.”172 The nature of a hostile work environment claim is that a 
single act may not be severe enough to constitute discrimination, but that same act, if 
sufficiently pervasive, might be. If the severe and pervasive element of a hostile work 
environment claim cannot be dissected, dissecting liability based on a hostile work 
environment is illogical. 
Not only are hostile work environment claims analyzed as a whole to determine 
the existence of a Title VII  violation, but if a violation is found—and liability 
attaches—the damages for hostile work environment claims are considered under the 
standard for continuing violations, not discrete acts.173 In National R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Morgan, the Court recognized that the discrete acts standard was 
inappropriate because the unlawful employment practice “cannot be said to occur on 
any particular day.”174  
Hostile work environment claims, therefore, are evaluated on the entire period of 
harassment—not individual acts—at every point in litigation except when attaching 
 
167 Id. at 836. She also suggested putting cameras in the trucks to deter male drivers from 
harassing female drivers. Id. 
168 Anderson v. CRST, Int’l, Inc., 685 F. App’x 524, 526–27 (9th Cir. 2017). 
169 Id. 
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
172 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 457 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
173 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 104 (2002). As long as a single act 
of harassing conduct falls within the statutory period required by Title VII, the victim can 
recover for the entire time he was harassed, even if some of those acts fell outside the 180- or 
300-day filing limit. Id. at 117. 
174 Id. at 115. 
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liability. This shift in thinking about harassment may be caused by the belief that 
discrimination is attributable not to employers, but to individual bad actors.175  
C. Probability of Harassment 
Work environments with harassment as pervasive as CRST may find it difficult to 
determine the exact cause of hostility; likely, it is systemic and responding to each act 
individually won’t solve the problem. But a meaningful analysis of its policies, 
whether it expresses a commitment to carrying out those polices, and careful 
monitoring of its employees’ interactions may help illuminate factors that are within 
its control to remedy. 
1. Authority of the Harasser 
Vance requires courts to make fact-specific inquiries into the authority a harasser 
has over his victim.176 If a harasser does not directly have the power to take tangible 
employment action against the victim—warranting the Ellerth-Faragher 
framework—the authority he does have must still be evaluated, because it is easier for 
an employee to harass a subordinate due to the nature of the relationship.177 An 
employer should expect that the dynamic of these relationships are likely to dissuade 
the victim from reporting harassment. The more authority a harasser has, the more 
likely unreported harassment is to occur.  
A harasser may hold some degree of authority over his victim without being a 
Vance supervisor.178 The more authority a harasser has, the more power he has over 
his victim, and the more likely it is that he was aided in harassing the victim by his 
 
175 Zimmer, supra note 98, at 585. See generally GREEN, supra note 98. 
176 Vance, 570 U.S. at 445–46 (“[T]he jury should be instructed that the nature and degree 
of authority wielded by the harasser is an important factor to be considered in determining 
whether the employer was negligent.”). 
177 See id. at 454 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Exposed to a fellow employee's harassment, 
one can walk away or tell the offender to ‘buzz off.’ A supervisor’s slings and arrows, however, 
are not so easily avoided.”). 
178 Not recognizing the inherent power of influential coworkers could have devastating 
consequences. In classical music, for example, principals are often influential in hiring members 
when a seat opens in their section; a concertmaster has even more influence. But because 
musicians are often unionized, courts will view a concertmaster or section principal as a victim’s 
coworker. Sex harassment is pervasive throughout classical music because prestigious 
musicians have tremendous influence in the classical music world and can ruin the careers of 
their victims. For a detailed account of this problem, see Anne Midgette & Peggy McGlone, 
Assaults in Dressing Rooms. Groping During Lessons. Classical Musicians Reveal a Profession 
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authority.179 Employers can easily recognize authority and should ensure that it does 
not go unchecked. 
2. Nature of Employment 
The nature of certain industries or workplaces can increase the likelihood that 
employees will be harassed.180 Two situations that increase the probability of 
harassment are homogenous workplaces and employees who work in isolation.181 In 
isolated environments, harassers can easily exploit their victims due to the lack of 
supervision and witnesses.182 An additional complication arises when workplace 
organization is decentralized with few obvious means of communication between 
organizational levels.183  
Low- and middle-wage jobs like manufacturing, construction, law enforcement, 
and janitorial work are traditionally male-dominated and have developed a “climate 
of tolerance and a culture of silence” around sex-based harassment.184 Harassment is 
calculated to make women feel unwelcome in the industry.185 
Sex harassment is also more likely to occur in workplaces dominated by one 
gender.186 Even in industries that are traditionally female, harassment can be more 
 
179 The amount of authority an employee has also reflects the amount of trust an employer 
placed in him, and victims find it more difficult to speak out against a trusted employee. This 
amount of trust should be considered in determining what the employer knew. Employers 
probably have more contact with employees who have authority than with those who don’t, 
giving them more opportunities to observe and correct unlawful conduct. 
180 EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 25–30 (discussing several risk factors that 
the EEOC considers “fertile ground for harassment”). 
181 Id. at 26, 29. 
182 Id. at 29. 
183 Id.; Durana et al., supra note 28, at 22. 
184 Durana et al., supra note 28, at 27–28. 
185 See generally Victoria L. Brescoll et al., Hard Won and Easily Lost: Status of Leaders in 
Gender-Stereotype-Incongruent Occupations, 21 PSYCH. SCI. 1640, 1641–42 (2010) 
(explaining that women’s mistakes are judged more harshly in these settings than men’s); Susan 
Chira, The ‘Manly’ Jobs Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/sunday-review/sexual-harassment-masculine-jobs.html 
[https://perma.cc/LR2C-QFSP] (describing blue-collar jobs as a “manly trifecta” because they 
pay a “breadwinner’s wage, embod[y] strength and form[] the backbone of the American 
economy”). These jobs are more likely to be unionized, which adds another layer to the problem. 
Unions fight any disciplinary action, especially termination, which leads to harassers staying in 
their jobs—even if the employer does take remedial action against them. Marion Crain & Ken 
Matheny, Sexual Harassment and Solidarity, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 66–67, 79 (2019). 
186 EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 26, app. C at 84; Durana et al., supra note 
28, at 17; Dana Kabat-Farr & Lilia M. Cortina, Sex-Based Harassment in Employment: New 
Insights into Gender and Context, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 58, 68 (2014). 
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likely when men hold most positions of authority.187 One study found that the more 
women were underrepresented in their workplaces, the more likely they were to be 
harassed.188 Employers in male-dominant workplaces should have frequent contact 
with their employees to set the tone of acceptable conduct and observe unlawful 
conduct. 
D. Duty of Employers 
Title VII imposes an affirmative duty on employers to promote and correct 
harassment, which begins before harassment is reported. A reasonable employer 
should become aware of harassment before an employee formally complains about it. 
Formal reporting procedures can emotionally exhaust victims and decrease their 
productivity.189 To avoid this, employers can take reasonable steps to discover 
harassment, which will shape how its employees see acceptable workplace conduct. 
1. Leading by Example 
Like any organization, workplaces take direction from their leadership—this 
includes values of workplace culture.190 Employers should be firm in their 
commitment to promoting harassment-free environments and holding harassers 
accountable when that value is underscored.191 When an employer’s leadership 
practices the conduct it wants its employees to promote, that conduct will become the 
standard throughout the company.192 A well thought-out anti-harassment policy is a 
good first step to meeting this goal, but employees will follow the example of 
leadership despite what is written in a policy. Employees entrusted with responsibility 
to lead a workplace should clearly communicate that the organization is committed to 
equality and inclusion, and the message should be as specific as possible to avoid 
appearing disingenuous.193  
 
187 Durana et al., supra note 28, at 5. 
188 Kabat-Farr & Cortina, supra note 186, at 68. Interestingly, when men were 
underrepresented in the workplace, this study found that they were less likely to be harassed. 
Id. One explanation may be that underrepresentation of men makes their status seem more 
prominent, and thus more authoritative. Id. 
189 See, e.g., EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 20–22 (describing the financial 
loss to employers caused by sex harassment, including decreased productivity by victims and 
other employees who observe misconduct); Cortina & Berdahl, supra note 28, at 483 (“[E]ven 
brief, subtly sexually harassing behaviors lead to impaired performance in victims.”). 
190 See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 31–32 (explaining that cultures of 
harassment “start[] at the top”). 
191 Id. at 31. 
192 Id. at 31–32. 
193 Rebecca K. Lee, Beyond the Rhetoric: What It Means to Lead in a Diverse and Unequal 
World, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 110, 119–20 (2018). 
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A related problem is how employers handle their “superstars,” employees who 
bring in a lot of money for the employer and have institutional respect.194 Employers 
may hesitate before disciplining superstars because of their financial value to the 
organization.195 However, continuing to employ a superstar harasser without 
attempting to correct his behavior can cause financial loss to an employer.196 
Additionally, the frequency with which employees even observe harassment can have 
a negative effect on the culture of the workplace by creating more hostility.197 
Employment environments with passive leaders who fail to address or purposefully 
avoid taking responsibility for such acts tend to have higher rates of harassment.198 
2. Recognizing Risk Factors and Investigating Complaints 
Employers should be required to regularly assess their workplaces to recognize 
risk factors indicating that harassment may be likely to occur; when identified, 
employers should determine how to minimize them.199  
When victims do complain about harassment, employers have an obligation to 
promptly investigate the allegation. The thoroughness of an investigation depends on 
the facts of each case. If a victim names several witnesses to the harassment who 
confirm the allegations, the harasser should be disciplined proportionate to the severity 
of his offense.200 If a victim is unaware of witnesses, an employer should be obligated 
to interview other employees who worked at the time the incident took place.201 
Because harassers often take advantage of isolation with a victim, many incidents 
will not have witnesses. When this happens, an employer cannot simply dismiss the 
allegation as uncorroborated and take no action.202 When employees frequently work 
in isolation, employers should be held to higher standards for deterring harassment, as 
they are less able to manage employees’ conduct. 
 
194 EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 24. 
195 Id.  
196 See, e.g., Cortina & Berdahl, supra note 28, at 477 (noting that “over 20 articles report 
that sexual harassment is associated with job dissatisfaction”). 
197 Junghyun Lee, Passive Leadership and Sexual Harassment: Roles of Observed Hostility 
and Workplace Gender Ratio, 47 PERSONNEL REV. 594, 598, 603 (2018). 
198 Id. at 595, 597, 603. 
199 At the very least, employers should take the steps suggested by the EEOC. The 2016 
report, for example, gives solutions for each risk factor it identifies. EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 28, at 84–88. 
200 Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987). 
201 But cf. Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624, 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding an 
employer’s failure to look for other witnesses reasonable, even when the victim told the human 
resources manager to ask other employees about her harasser’s conduct). 
202 But see id. at 626, 630 (finding it reasonable to discount an uncorroborated allegation of 
harassment, even when other allegations had been made against the harasser). 
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V. RESTORATIVE MEDIATION 
As discussed in detail above, the current legal framework for evaluating 
harassment claims fails to achieve Title VII’s goal of ending employment 
discrimination.203 The shift in tone of the Supreme Court’s sex harassment opinions 
indicate that it is unlikely to interpret the framework in a way helpful to plaintiffs.204 
The tendency to view discrimination as an individual problem—and the related view 
that systemic discrimination no longer exists—means that change is unlikely to come 
from district courts first hearing harassment claims.205 
The biggest problem with the current framework is that it creates a loophole that 
allows harassment to go uncorrected. When courts get to the liability question in a sex 
harassment case, they have already determined that the plaintiff experienced 
harassment at work. Title VII does not impose liability on individuals, only employers, 
so if the plaintiff can’t hold her employer liable, her case is over. The employer may 
have some incentive to review its policies to avoid spending money on litigation again, 
but without informed guidance the policies and procedures are likely to conform to 
the same standard of superficial compliance that has failed to address workplace 
harassment since Title VII was passed. Moreover, the victim leaves the process 
without closure or compensation. I address alternatives for compensation and 
mediation in this Part.   
Remedies under Title VII should make the plaintiff whole, or as near to whole as 
possible.206 Once courts find that sex harassment—or any type of unlawful 
discrimination—occurred, they should determine what remedies will make the 
plaintiff whole. If her employer cannot be held liable under the modern liability 
framework, then courts need to explore other remedies, particularly those that will 
address the hostile work environment of the entire workplace. 
Federal courts have broad power to order remedies subject to certain limitations.207 
In the case of Title VII litigation, courts should use this power to compel mandatory 
mediation if they find a hostile work environment but fail to find a basis for imputing 
employer liability. Many commentators have criticized the use of mandatory 
mediation in Title VII cases,208 and I don’t argue that it should be used in place of 
litigation. Rather, mediation should only be used when ordinary standards of liability 
 
203 See supra Section III.A. 
204 See supra Section III.B. 
205 See supra Part III. 
206 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (“It is also the purpose of Title 
VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination. This is shown by the very fact that Congress took care to arm the courts with 
full equitable powers.”). 
207 In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002). These limitations are discussed 
in detail in Section V.D.1, infra. 
208 Ann C. Hodges, Employee Voice in Arbitration, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 235, 237–
41 (2018); Nuñez, supra note 114, at 506–12. 
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would otherwise prevent a successful claim. Mediation should be focused on 
restorative justice, a concept discussed below. So focused, compelled mediation serves 
both the ends of alternative dispute resolution and actively works to correct hostile 
work environments, thus advancing the aims of Title VII in a way current litigation 
does not. 
A. Restorative Justice 
Another important component of mediation is the opportunity for the victim to 
explain to her employer and her harasser, if she chooses, the effects the harassment 
caused. This is a critical piece missing from current anti-harassment procedures. 
Policies, procedures, and trainings are impersonal. Coworkers and their stories 
humanize the issue and explain the effects of harassment in a way a training manual 
never can. Harassers need to hear their victims—their coworkers—and they need to 
understand the pain they’ve caused. Only then will they stop their harassing conduct. 
Employers also need to hear the pain harassment causes their employees. 
Supervisors and managers will be more likely to monitor the workplace for harassment 
if they understand how harmful it can be.209 To effectively carry out these goals, 
mediation should be focused on restorative justice. 
Restorative justice is a criminal justice ideology focused on healing all parties to a 
crime.210 Restorative justice is better understood as a concept or a theory of criminal 
justice than one approach with one definition.211 Central to each formulation, however, 
is the idea that criminal conduct causes harm to more than just the victim.212 A 
community is harmed by criminal activity,213 and communities often take an active 
role in an offender’s rehabilitation to make up for any inadequate support in the past.214 
The offender is also a party to process; the community recognizes that it failed the 
 
209 The proposal in this Section is of course premised on the belief that people will want to 
change their conduct once they understand the pain they cause. Unless you believe that people 
are ambivalent to the pain they cause others—and I do not—then I think this is the only way to 
bring about real change. Harassers are going to go through their own pain during this realization, 
but then the workplace will finally be able to heal. Employers, unless they are ambivalent, will 
be moved to monitor the workplace because they have a more complete understanding of the 
harms of harassment and how they can prevent it. 
210 LODE WALGRAVE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, SELF-INTEREST AND RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP 
31–41 (Routledge 2012). 
211 Id. (exploring modern restorative justice practices); id. at 46–53 (describing how 
restorative justice shares similar goals with the traditional theories of criminal justice). 
212 Lode Walgrave, Towards Restoration as the Mainstream in Youth Justice, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 3, 5–6 (Elizabeth Elliott & Robert M. Gordon eds., 
Routledge 2011). 
213 Id.  
214 John Perry, Introduction: Challenging the Assumptions, in REPAIRING COMMUNITIES 
THROUGH RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 11–12 (John Perry ed., 2002). 
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offender as much as the victim, and the community attempts to heal the offender’s 
brokenness.215 
One common restorative justice model is victim-offender mediation, based on the 
idea that the victim and the offender have a shared interest in righting a wrong.216 The 
emphasis is placed on reconciliation—victims tell offenders how the crime has 
affected them, and then “the parties may decide together what needs to be done about 
what happened and reach a mutually satisfying agreement.”217 Restorative justice also 
seeks to transform a negative experience—usually a crime—into a way to heal for all 
involved.218 Every attempt is made to right the wrong; if the offender does not have 
the skills to do this alone, the community helps him.219 
Though the results of restorative justice studies often vary depending on the type 
of crime committed, in most cases the experience has been profoundly meaningful to 
all parties involved. One study found that participants felt the process was fair 80–
95% of the time.220 
B. Applying Restorative Justice Principles to Sex Harassment Law 
Restorative justice is meaningful for victims in criminal cases because it allows 
them to be directly involved with the outcome of the offense.221 In a sex harassment 
case, the benefit to the victim lies in her involvement with institutional changes mean 
 
215 Id.; see also BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY 289 (2014). Bryan Stevenson writes 
beautifully about brokenness and healing in JUST MERCY: 
We are all broken by something. We have all hurt someone and have been hurt. 
. . . I guess I’d always known but never fully considered that being broken is 
what makes us human. . . . Sometimes we’re fractured by the choices we make; 
sometimes we’re shattered by things we would never have chosen. But our 
brokenness is also the source of our common humanity, the basis for our shared 
search for . . . healing. Our shared vulnerability and imperfection nurtures and 
sustains our capacity for compassion. We have a choice. We can embrace our 
humanness, which means embracing our broken natures and the compassion 
that remains our best hope for healing. Or we can deny our brokenness, forswear 
compassion, and, as a result, deny our own humanity. 
Id. 
216 MARGARITA ZERNOVA, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEALS AND REALITIES 8 (Routledge 2016). 
217 Id.  
218 MARIAN LIEBMANN, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HOW IT WORKS 25–26 (2007). 
219 Id. at 27. 
220 Kathleen Daly, A Tale of Two Studies: Restorative Justice from a Victim’s Perspective, 
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 212, at 155. 
221 Jennifer J. Llewellyn et al., Imagining Success for a Restorative Approach to Justice: 
Implications for Measurement and Evaluation, DALHOUSIE L.J. 281, 294 (2013). 
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to end harassment at to change the harassment-ridden culture of a workplace and, if 
she still works there, repair her working relationships. 
Any agreement reached during restorative justice mediation would be binding on 
all parties, as is typical for alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”). The agreement will 
effectively put the employer on notice that it needs to take affirmative steps to 
eliminate the culture of illegal conduct. Courts can retain jurisdiction over the case to 
ensure enforcement of the agreement and if any claims of discrimination are filed 
during that time, the agreement will serve as a presumption of knowledge. Thus, the 
agreement serves as an incentive for employers to perform more than superficial 
compliance with Title VII but does not hold them monetarily liable for harassment 
without legal knowledge.222 
The type of restorative justice method employed should vary depending on the 
victim’s preference. If the victim feels uncomfortable interacting with the harasser, 
the mediation should include the victim and the employer and then the employer and 
the harasser. If she does feel comfortable interacting with the harasser, then the 
mediation should include all three parties at once. 
1. Failure of Strict Punishment 
A goal of restorative mediation is to teach harassers why their conduct is wrong, 
not to punish them without explanation, a response likely to foster resentment and 
unlikely to change behavior. Even if a harasser is fired, the employer has only moved 
the problem elsewhere, a response not in line with Title VII’s purpose of ending 
discrimination. People are likely to respond to corrective action more than punitive 
action, especially if they don’t understand why they are being punished. Restorative 
justice will convey to harassers why their conduct deserves punishment and, 
hopefully, change their perceptions and behaviors. 
C. Title VII’s Conciliation Requirement  
Title VII requires the EEOC to attempt to conciliate each case it handles and reach 
a settlement with the employer and victim before pursuing legal action.223 While the 
requirement only applies in cases where the EEOC finds reasonable cause and works 
to correct the discrimination, which only happens in about fifteen to seventeen percent 
of charges the agency receives.224 With the EEOC litigating a negligible percent of 
 
222 I say “legal knowledge” because the current standards encourage turning a blind eye and 
it is often difficult to argue that employers didn’t actually know about harassing conduct. See, 
e.g., Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624, 629–30 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding an employer 
not liable for harassing the plaintiff, despite moving the harasser to her shift after a different 
employee complained about his behavior); Clehm v. Bae Sys. Ordnance Sys., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 
3d 775, 788–89 (W.D. Va. 2017), aff’d, 786 F. App’x 391 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that an 
employer was not liable for a hostile work environment, despite its knowledge of other instances 
of misconduct by the employee who harassed the plaintiff). 
223 40. U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480 (2015). 
224 All Statutes (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997–FY 2020, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/all-statutes-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-
1997-fy-2020 [https://perma.cc/EU29-3XY8]. “Merit resolutions” are the sum of charges where 
the EEOC finds reasonable cause, regardless of the outcome of those charges (i.e. successful 
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discrimination cases,225 it is hardly fair to deny individual plaintiffs’ claims on the 
basis that Title VII maintains a preference for conciliation—a process specific to the 
EEOC. Nevertheless, Title VII’s preference for “[c]ooperation and voluntary 
compliance” has become a common refrain.226 
However, employers are not voluntarily complying with Title VII; instead, they 
respond to grievances on an individual basis and fail to address their own role in 
causing an environment where harassment continues. Neither does dismissing a 
plaintiff’s case allow her to attempt conciliation with her employer—her case simply 
ends—so the focus on conciliation and voluntary compliance is misguided. 
1. Properly Invoking Conciliation in Individual Claims 
If courts want to continue to focus on Title VII’s preference for conciliation, they 
should at least provide the parties with the means to conciliate. Without EEOC 
involvement, the court can impose mediation to give the victim an opportunity to 
explain where she believes her employer failed in addressing harassment. Consulting 
with the EEOC, or at least referencing publications that reflect its expertise, should be 
strongly encouraged.227 The process needs to include some expert that will break the 
cycle of superficial compliance in anti-harassment policies. 
A mediation agreement should serve as a presumption that the employer has 
knowledge of a hostile environment for a reasonable time after the conclusion of the 
 
conciliation, unsuccessful conciliation, private settlement). For the definition of each term, see 
Definitions of Terms, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/definitions-terms [https://perma.cc/BC93-PATY] (last updated 
May 2020). 
225 The EEOC litigated 144 substantive employment discrimination cases in 2019, or 1.15% 
of all employment cases heard by U.S. district courts. In 2020, the EEOC litigated 93 substantive 
cases, which comprised 0.82% of employment cases heard by the district courts. See EEOC 
Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2020, U.S. EQUAL EMP . OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/eeoc-litigation-statistics-fy-1997-through-fy-2020 
[https://perma.cc/4UNX-W5GV]; Table C-2—U.S. District Courts–Civil Statistical Tables for 
the Federal Judiciary, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-
2/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2020/12/31 [https://perma.cc/5LSM-B729] (data table on 
file with author). The employment cases may include disputes other than discrimination, which 
would increase the percentage of relevant cases the EEOC is involved in. However, even that 
increase is likely to be negligible. 
226 Mach Mining, LLC, 575 U.S. at 486 (alteration in original) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. 
EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982)); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 
(1974); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (“Although Title VII 
seeks ‘to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination,’ its ‘primary objective,’ like that of any statute meant to influence primary 
conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.” (first quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975); and then quoting Moody, 422 U.S. at 417); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (“For example, Title VII is designed to encourage the 
creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”).  
227 The EEOC is authorized to “education, technical assistance, and training relating to laws 
administered by the Commission” by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(k). 
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mediation. The exact time will depend on each case and can be determined during the 
mediation.228 The more risk factors that exist should extend the amount of time the 
employer is on notice, as they should understand the threat posed by those risk factors 
after successful mediation and thus have a duty to closely monitor their workplace.  
If another employee brings a harassment claim against the employer within the 
time established by the mediation agreement, the employer should be presumed 
negligent. The presumption shouldn’t attach until the mediation period concludes to 
avoid punishing the employer for making a good faith effort to comply with Title VII. 
This approach will force employers to address their role in causing harassment. 
D. Compensation 
In cases where courts find that the plaintiff proved harassment but could not prove 
the negligence standard for holding her employer liable, she should still be 
compensated for some of her injuries. The clearest method of doing this would be for 
Congress to amend Title VII to explicitly allow such a program and appropriate funds 
as needed. A second legislative method would be for Congress to better fund the 
EEOC, which may lead to more administrative conciliation attempts and obviate the 
need for lawsuits. 
Legislative action is the clearest path to compensating victims from a source other 
than their employers. Title VII could be amended to include an additional monetary 
penalty on defendants who have been found liable for discrimination, which would 
contribute to funding mediation and compensation. The rest of the funding would be 
appropriated by Congress.229 
Ideally, the EEOC should also be expanded so that their expertise can inform more 
conciliations, mediations, and revisions of anti-harassment policies. A better-funded 
EEOC may allow the agency to take on more charges and litigation, which would in 
many ways obviate the need for this proposal. 
1. Restorative Justice Mediation Is Consistent with the Broad Powers of 
Federal Courts 
Four main restrictions limit a court’s ability to impose mandatory mediation:  
[A] district court’s inherent powers are not infinite. There are at least four 
limiting principles. First, inherent powers must be used in a way reasonably 
suited to the enhancement of the court’s processes, including the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of pending cases. Second, inherent powers cannot be 
exercised in a manner that contradicts an applicable statute or rule. Third, the 
 
228 Factors might include change of management during the process, the typical turnover rate 
in at the company, and the presence of risk factors identified in Section IV.D.2 and EEOC TASK 
FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 25–30. 
229 Attaching money that likely comes, at least in part, form taxpayers is of course always a 
bold suggestion. I, for one, feel it’s appropriate for Americans to compensate victims of 
harassment for the broken promise of Title VII.  
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use of inherent powers must comport with procedural fairness. And, finally, 
inherent powers “must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”230 
In the context of Title VII claims, court-compelled mediation in the absence of 
liability meets all of these requirements. First, compelling mediation—thereby 
sending the case out of court—would facilitate the “orderly and expeditious 
disposition of pending cases” in much the same way as the current method of granting 
summary judgment.231 Second, far from contradicting Title VII, compelling 
restorative justice mediation enhances its purpose and returns some force to the statute. 
Congress did not intend for Title VII to become a safe harbor for employers to invoke 
ineffective anti-harassment policies.232 While mandatory mediation does not provide 
the remedies allowed for by Title VII, it is a step closer to making plaintiffs whole 
compared to the existing legal framework. Moreover, restorative justice acts in concert 
with the ultimate aim of Title VII—protection from discriminatory employment 
practices—by incentivizing employers to correct hostile work environments. 
Third, as discussed above, procedural fairness is absent from the current legal 
landscape. Imposing mediation would balance the interests of employers and 
employees more effectively. Finally, using this remedy with restraint and discretion 
should be easy to comply with. Summary judgment can still act as the gatekeeper to 
filter out truly unmeritorious claims; hopefully, however, summary judgment will be 
granted less frequently when courts can keep cases off their dockets. This approach 
also has the benefit of protecting harassers from harsh punishment, which is another 
consequence of discrimination laundering.233 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Over the past few decades, women have been entering the workforce in record 
numbers.234 Despite this improvement, disparities still exist between men and women 
in the workplace.235 Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of 
sex and it recognizes as discriminatory both quid-pro-quo harassment and hostile work 
environment harassment.236 What many men have long seen as harmless flirtation or 
jokes, many women find offensive. While Title VII does not reach “genuine but 
innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members 
 
230 In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 
231 See Bennett, supra note 85, at 690–93; Beiner, supra note 96, at 793. 
232 Chuck Henson, The Purposes of Title VII, 33 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
221, 224 (2019). 
233 See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling Harassers in 
an At-Will World, 128 YALE L.J.F. 85 (2018). 
234 Exec. Order No. 13,506, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,271 (Mar. 11, 2009). 
235 Id.  
236 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 
67 (1986). 
40https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
2021]         EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEX HARASSMENT  717 
 
of the same sex and of the opposite sex,”237 it can—and should—respond to changes 
in what society considers innocuous. 
Just as society’s views of what is acceptable and unacceptable change, the legal 
system adapts to meet new demands. New causes of action are developed or expanded, 
and courts adopt new interpretations of issues previously thought to have been settled. 
In the field of criminal law, some states have implemented restorative justice practices, 
which focus on the cause of crime in addition to determining the proper punishment.238 
Restorative justice offers promising developments in criminal law, as it is preferred 
by victims of crime and serves as an incentive for perpetrators of crime to accept 
responsibility.239 Restorative justice can serve an important role in Title VII claims by 
ensuring employers listen to the experiences of their employees, that harassers 
understand the pain they have caused and take responsibility for it, and allowing Title 
VII to bring about change in employment discrimination law once again. 
Currently, the crux of the negligence standard and the Ellerth-Faragher 
affirmative defense is whether an employer has an anti-harassment policy and whether 
the victim reported the harassment. At the time of Ellerth and Faragher, anti-
harassment policies were new and thought to be an effective way to correct and 
prevent workplace harassment. However, recent studies of sex harassment have shown 
that anti-harassment policies and formal reporting measures fail to curtail workplace 
harassment. Courts need to reframe the standards of Title VII harassment claims to 
reflect how victims actually respond to harassment. 
Once courts begin looking at sex harassment as an institutional injury, the next 
question is how to address it. If a court finds that a hostile work environment existed, 
but that an employer cannot be held liable, it effectively dismisses any harassment 
faced by a plaintiff and weakens Title VII. To preserve the force of Title VII, an 
employer cannot escape liability once an employee has proved an actionable claim. 
Since courts are reluctant to impose monetary liability on employers unless tangible 
action was taken against the plaintiff, other remedies should be explored. As part of 
the remedy, courts can organize face-to-face meetings between the employee and her 
employer, much like face-to-face meetings in ordinary restorative justice. Some forms 
of restorative justice involve community input. In sex harassment cases, the employer 
is the community. A plaintiff may not want to stay with her employer, but working 
with that employer to help other women avoid the harassment she faced is a powerful 
way of healing. 
Restorative justice is appropriate in sex harassment claims because it is not just an 
individual who is hurt by the harassing conduct, but families, employers, and the 
national workforce. Restorative justice seeks to involve victims, perpetrators, and the 
 
237 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
238 LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN & HEATHER STRANG, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE EVIDENCE 12 
(2007). 
239 Id. at 8. 
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community affected by crime.240 The same principles apply to fighting toxic 
workplace cultures. 
Sex harassment law in the United States has progressed from Anita Hill’s Senate 
testimony to Christine Blasey Ford’s Senate testimony, but just like the Senate, courts 
only care about appearing to prevent sex harassment. Courts can advance Title VII 
law by loosening restrictions on employer liability and punishing ineffective anti-
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